The heart of the task of building public key cryptosystems is viewed as that of making trapdoors;" in fact, public key cryptosystems and trapdoor functions are often discussed as synonymous. How accurate is this view? In this paper we endeavor to get a better understanding of the nature of trapdoorness" and its relation to public key cryptosystems, by broadening the scope of the investigation: we look at general trapdoor functions; that is, functions that are not necessarily injective ie., one-to-one. Our rst result is somewhat surprising: we show that non-injective trapdoor functions with super-polynomial pre-image size can be constructed from any one-way function and hence it is unlikely that they su ce for public key encryption. On the other hand, we show that trapdoor functions with polynomial pre-image size are su cient for public key encryption. Together, these two results indicate that the pre-image size is a fundamental parameter of trapdoor functions. We then turn our attention to the converse, asking what kinds of trapdoor functions can be constructed from public key cryptosystems. We take a rst step by showing that in the random-oracle model one can construct injective trapdoor functions from any public key cryptosystem.
Introduction
A major dividing line in the realm of cryptographic primitives is that between one-way" and trapdoor" primitives. The former e ectively means the primitives of private key cryptography, while the latter are typically viewed as tied to public key cryptosystems. Indeed, the understanding is that the problem of building public key cryptosystems is the problem of making trapdoors."
Is it really? It is well known that injective ie. one-to-one trapdoor functions su ce for public key cryptography Y a, GoMi . We ask: is the converse true as well, or can public key cryptosystems exist under a weaker assumption? We take a closer look at the notion of a trapdoor, in particular from the point of view of how it relates to semantically secure encryption schemes, and discover some curious things. Amongst these are that trapdoor one-way functions" are not necessarily hard to build, and their relation to public key encryption is more subtle than it might seem.
Background
The main notions discussed and related in this paper are one-way functions DiHe , trapdoor one-way functions DiHe , semantically secure encryption schemes GoMi , and unapproximable trapdoor predicates GoMi .
Roughly, a one-way function" means a family of functions where each particular function is easy to compute, but most are hard to invert; trapdoor functions are the same with the additional feature that associated to each particular function is some trapdoor" information, possession of which permits easy inversion. See Section 2 for formal de nitions.
In the study of one-way functions, it is well appreciated that the functions need not be injective: careful distinctions are made between general one-way functions", injective one-way functions," and one-way permutations." In principle, the distinction applies equally well to trapdoor one-way functions. In the non-injective case, knowledge of the trapdoor permits recovery of some preimage of any given range point DiHe . However, all attention in the literature has focused on injective trapdoor functions, perhaps out of the sense that this is what is necessary for constructing encryption schemes: the injectivity o f the trapdoor function guarantees the unique decryptability of the encryption scheme. This paper investigates general ie. not necessarily injective trapdoor one-way functions and how they relate to other primitives. Our goal is to understand exactly what kinds of trapdoor oneway functions are necessary and su cient for building semantically secure public key encryption schemes; in particular, is injectivity actually necessary?
Among non-injective trapdoor functions, we make a further distinction based on the amount of non-injectivity", measured by pre-image size. A trapdoor, one-way function is said to have pre-image size Qk where k is the security parameter if the number of pre-images of any range point is at most Qk. We show that pre-image size is a crucial parameter with regard to building public-key cryptosystems out of a trapdoor function.
Rather than directly working with public-key cryptosystems, it will be more convenient to work with a more basic primitive called an unapproximable trapdoor predicate. Unapproximable trapdoor predicates are equivalent to semantically secure public key schemes for encrypting a single bit, and these in turn are equivalent to general semantically secure cryptosystems GoMi .
Results
We have three main results. They are displayed in Figure 1 together with known relations. We now discuss them. One-way functions imply trapdoor functions. Our rst result, given in Theorem 3.1, may seem surprising at rst glance: we show that one-way functions imply trapdoor functions. We present a general construction which, given an arbitrary one-way function, yields a trapdoor noninjective one-way function.
Put in other words, we show that trapdoor functions are not necessarily hard to build; it is the combination of trapdoorness with structural" properties like injectivity that may be hard to achieve. Thus the curtain" between one-way and trapdoor primitives is not quite as opaque as it may seem.
What does this mean for public key cryptography? Impagliazzo and Rudich ImRu show that it would be very hard, or unlikely, to get a proof that one-way functions even if injective imply public key cryptosystems. Hence, our result shows that it is unlikely that any known technique can be used to construct public key encryption schemes from generic, non-injective, trapdoor functions. As one might guess given ImRu , our construction does not preserve injectivity, so even if the starting one-way function is injective, the resulting trapdoor one-way function is not.
Trapdoor functions with poly pre-image size yield cryptosystems. In light of the above, one might still imagine that injectivity o f the trapdoor functions is required to obtain public key encryption. Still, we ask whether the injectivity condition can be relaxed somewhat. Speci cally, the trapdoor one-way functions which w e construct from one-way functions have super-polynomial pre-image size. This leads us to ask about trapdoor functions with polynomially bounded pre-image size.
Our second result, Theorem 4.1, shows that trapdoor functions with polynomially bounded pre-image size su ce to construct unapproximable trapdoor predicates, and hence yield public key cryptosystems. This belies the impression that injectivity o f the trapdoor function is a necessary feature to directly build a public key cryptosystem from it, and also suggests that the superpolynomial pre-image size in the construction of Theorem 3.1 is necessary.
From trapdoor predicates to trapdoor functions. We then turn to the other side of the coin and ask what kinds of trapdoor functions must necessarily exist to have a public key cryptosystem. Since unapproximable trapdoor predicates and semantically secure public key cryptosystems are equivalent GoMi we consider the question of whether unapproximable trapdoor predicates imply injective trapdoor functions.
In fact whether or not semantically secure public key cryptosystems imply injective trapdoor 
Discussion and implications
Theorems 3.1 and 4.1 indicate that pre-image size is a crucial parameter when considering the power of trapdoor functions, particularly with respect to constructing public-key cryptosystems.
The signi cance and interpretation of Theorem 5.2, however, requires a bit more discussion. At rst glance, it may seem that public key cryptosystems obviously imply" injective trapdoor functions. After all, a public key cryptosystem permits unique decryptability; doesn't this mean the encryption algorithm is injective? No, because, as per GoMi , it is a probabilistic algorithm, and thus not a function. To make it a function, you must consider it a function of two arguments, the message and the coins, and then it may no longer be injective, because two coin sequences could give rise to the same ciphertext for a given message. Moreover, it may no longer have a full trapdoor, since it may not be possible to recover the randomness from the ciphertext. Public key cryptosystems in the Di e and Hellman sense DiHe imply injective trapdoor one-way functions as the authors remark, but that's because encryption there is deterministic. It is now understood that secure encryption must be probabilistic GoMi .
Theorem 5.2 has several corollaries. Caveat: All in the random oracle model. First, by applying a transformation of BeRo , it follows that we can construct non-malleable and chosenciphertext secure encryption schemes based on the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem AjDw . Second, combining Theorems 5.2 and 4.1, the existence of trapdoor functions with polynomially bounded pre-image size implies the existence of injective trapdoor functions. With high probability over the choice of oracle. See Remark 5.11. Third, if the Decisional Di e-Hellman problem is hard this means the El Gamal ElG cryptosystem is semantically secure then there exists an injective trapdoor function.
Note that in the random oracle model, it is trivial to construct almost injective one-way functions: a random oracle mapping, say, n bits to 3n bits, is itself an injective one-way function except with probability 2 , n o v er the choice of the oracle. However, random oracles do not directly or naturally give rise to trapdoors ImRu . Thus, it is interesting to note that our construction in Theorem 5.2 uses the oracle to amplify" a trapdoor property: we convert the weak trapdoor property of a cryptosystem in which one can only recover the message to a strong one in which one can recover both the message and the randomness used. Another interpretation of Theorem 5.2 is as a demonstration that there exists a model in which semantically secure encryption implies injective trapdoor functions, and hence it may be hard to prove a separation result, in the style of ImRu , between injective trapdoor functions and probabilistic encryption schemes.
De nitions
We present de nitions for one-way functions, trapdoor functions, and unapproximable trapdoor predicates.
Preliminaries. If S is any probability distribution then x S denotes the operation of selecting an element uniformly at random according to S, and S is the support of S, namely the set of all points having non-zero probability under S. If S is a set we view it as imbued with the uniform distribution and write x S. If A is a probabilistic algorithm or function then Ax; y; ; R denotes the output of A on inputs x ; y ; : : : and coins R, while Ax ; y ; : : : is the probability distribution assigning to each string the probability, o v er R, that it is output. For deterministic algorithms or functions A, we write z:=Ax ; y ; : : : t o mean that the output of Ax ; y ; : : : is assigned to z. The notation Pr E : R 1 ; R 2 ; : : : ; R k refers to the probability o f e v ent E after the random processes R 1 ; : : : ; R k are performed in order. If x and y are strings we write their concatenation as xky or just xy. Polynomial time" means time polynomial in the security parameter k, PPT stands for probabilistic, polynomial time", and e cient" means computable in polynomial time or PPT.
One-way and trapdoor function families
We rst de ne families of functions, then say what it means for them to be one-way or trapdoor.
Families of Functions. A family of functions is a collection F = fF k g k2N where each F k is probability distribution over a set of functions. Each f 2 F k has an associated domain Domf and range Rangef. We require three properties of the family:
Can generate: The operation f F k can be e ciently implemented, meaning there is a PPT generation algorithm F-Gen that on input 1 k outputs a description" of a function f distributed according to F k . This algorithm might also output some auxiliary information aux associated to this function this is in order to later model trapdoors.
Can sample: Domf is e ciently samplable, meaning there is a PPT algorithm F-Smp that given f 2 F k returns a uniformly distributed element of Domf.
Can evaluate: f is e ciently computable, meaning there is a polynomial time evaluation algorithm F-Eval that given f 2 F k and x 2 Domf returns fx. For an element y 2 Rangef w e denote the set of pre-images of y under f by f ,1 y = f x 2 Domf : fx = y g : W e say that F is injective if f is injective ie. one-to-one for every f 2 F k . If in addition Domf = Rangef then we say that F is a family of permutations. We measure the amount of non-injectivity" by looking at the maximum pre-image size. Speci cally we say that F has pre-image size bounded by Qk i f j f , 1 y j Q k for all f 2 F k , all y 2 Rangef and all k 2 N.
We s a y that F has polynomially bounded p r e-image size if there is a polynomial Qk which bounds the pre-image size of F. One-wayness. Let F be a family of functions as above. The inverting probability of an algorithm I; with respect to F is a function of the security parameter k, de ned as InvProb F I ; k def = Pr x 0 2 f ,1 y : f F k ; x Domf ; y f x ; x 0 I f;y : Fis one-way if InvProb F I ; k is negligible for any PPT algorithm I.
Trapdoorness. A family of functions is said to be trapdoor if it is possible, while generating an instance f, to simultaneously generate as auxiliary output trapdoor information" tp, knowledge of which permits inversion of f. Formally, a family of functions F is trapdoor if F-Gen outputs pairs f;tp where f is the description" of a function as in any family of functions and tp is auxiliary trapdoor information. We require that there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm F-Inv such that for all k, all f;tp 2 F-Gen1 k , and all points y 2 Rangef, the algorithm F-Invf;tp; y outputs an element of f ,1 y with probability 1 . A family of trapdoor functions is said to be one-way if it is also a family of one-way functions. Rab-Inv, given N, p; q, and a quadratic-residue y mod N, computes the square roots of y modulo both p and q which can bedone in polynomial time Be, AMM and then uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to obtain a square root of y modulo N. Notice that the Rabin function family is not injective, as every quadratic residue mod N has four square roots. Traditionally, this function is used as the basis of a public key cryptosystem by rst modifying it to be injective.
Remark 2.2 It is well known that one can de ne one-way functions either in terms of function families as above, or in terms of a single function, and the two are equivalent. However, for trapdoor functions, one must talk of families. To maintain consistency, we use the family view of one-way functions as well.
Trapdoor Predicate Families
We de ne unapproximable trapdoor predicate families GoMi . Recall that such a family is equivalent to a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme for a single bit GoMi .
A predicate in our context means a probabilistic function with domain f0; 1g, meaning a predicate p takes a bit b and ips coins r to generate some output y = pb; r. In a trapdoor predicate family P = fP k g k2N , each P k is a probability distribution over a set of predicates, meaning each p 2 P k is a predicate as above. We require:
Can generate: There is a generation algorithm P-Gen which on input 1 k outputs p; tp where p is distributed randomly according to P k and tp is trapdoor information associated to p. In particular the operation p P k can be e ciently implemented. Can evaluate: There is a PPT algorithm P-Eval that given p and b 2 f 0 ; 1 g ips coins to output y distributed according to pb. We s a y P has decryption error k if there is a PPT algorithm P-Inv who, with knowledge of the trapdoor, fails to decrypt only with this probability, namely DecErr P P -Inv; k def = Pr b 0 6 = b : p P k ; b f 0 ; 1 g ; y p b ; b 0 P -Invp; tp; y 1 is at most k. If we say nothing it is to be assumed that the decryption error is zero, but sometimes we w ant to discuss families with non-zero and even large decryption error.
Unapproximability. Let P be a family of trapdoor predicates as above. The predicting advantage of an algorithm I; with respect to P is a function of the security parameter k, de This is proved by taking an arbitrary family F of one-way functions and embedding" a trapdoor to get a family G of trapdoor functions. The rest of this section is devoted to the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Given a family F = fF k g k2N of one-way functions we show h o w to construct a family G = fG k g k2N of trapdoor one-way functions.
Let us rst sketch the idea. Given f 2 F k we want to construct g which mimics" f but somehow e m beds a trapdoor. The idea is that the trapdoor is a particular point in the domain of f. Function g will usually just evaluate f, except if it detects that its input contains the trapdoor; in that case it will do something trivial, making g easy to invert given knowledge of the trapdoor.
This will not happen often in normal execution because it is unlikely that a randomly chosen input contains the trapdoor. But how exactly can g detect" the trapdoor? The rst idea would be to include in the description of g so that it can check whether its input contains the trapdoor, but then g would no longer be one-way. So instead the description of g will include = f , an image of the trapdoor under the original function f, and g will run f on a candidate trapdoor to see whether the result matches . Note that we do not in fact necessarily detect the real trapdoor ; the trivial action is taken whenever some pre-image of under f is detected. But that turns out to be OK.
In the actual construction, g has three inputs, y; x; v, where v plays the role of the normal" input to f; x plays the role of the candidate trapdoor; and y is the trivial" answer returned in case the trapdoor is detected. We now formally specify the construction and sketch a prof that it is correct.
A particular function g 2 G k will be described by a pair f; where f 2 F k and 2
Rangef. It is de ned on inputs y; x; v by gy; x; v = yif fx = f v otherwise.
2 Here x; v 2 Domf, and we draw y from some samplable superset S f of Rangef. To be speci c, we set S f to the set of all strings of length at most pk where pk is a polynomial that bounds the lengths of all strings in Rangef. So the domain of g is Domg = S f Domf Domf.
We now give an intuitive explanation of why G is one-way and trapdoor. First note that for any z it is the case that z; ; is a preimage of z under g, so knowing enables one to invert in a trivial manner, hence G is trapdoor. For one-wayness, notice that if gy; x; v = z then either fv = z or fx = . Thus, producing an element o f g , 1 z requires inverting f at either z or , both of which are hard by the one-wayness of F. We now proceed with a more formal proof that G satis es the de nition of a family of one-way trapdoor functions.
The generator G-Gen takes input 1 k and lets f F k ; Domf ; := f . It outputs g; where the function g is as de ned above, and = tp is the trapdoor. The operations of G-Gen can be performed in PPT given that F is a family of functions as per our de nition. Notice that it is possible to sample uniformly from Domg = S f DomfDomf in PPT as required to be a family of functions because each of the three constituent sets has this property. It is to make this true that we used S f rather than Rangef in the rst component.
Finally it is clear that gy; x; v can beevaluated in polyk time since this is assumed true for f. We need to check two things; that G is a trapdoor family, meaning possession of permits inversion, and that G retains the one-wayness of F.
Claim 3.2 The family G is trapdoor. Proof: We show that knowing the trapdoor information allows one to invert g. Formally, we de ne the inverter as follows. Let w beany point in Rangeg where g is described by f; . Then set G-Invg; ; w = w; ; : To see that this works, rst notice that w; ; is indeed in Domg because w, being in Rangeg, is also in S f , and is in Domf. Now apply Equation 2 to compute gw; ; : since f = w e get gw; ; = w . Thus, w; ; is indeed a pre-image of w under g, as desired.
It remains to show that G is one-way. Intuitively, this is true because producing an element of g ,1 w requires producing either an element o f f , 1 w or an element o f f , 1 , both of which are hard by the one-wayness of F. The following proof formalizes this intuition. Then we h a v e s k s 1 k + s 2 k , so it su ces to prove that both s 1 k and s 2 k are negligible. Subclaim 1: s 1 k is negligible.
We will construct an inverter I 1 for F which succeeds with probability s 1 k. Then, by the onewayness of F, it follows that s 1 k is negligible. I 1 is constructed as follows:
Inverter I 1 f;z Note that the input w fed to I by I 1 in the above is distributed exactly as in Experiment 1 when we also consider the initial choices of f F k and z fu for uniformly selected u Domf.
Thus, we know that I will produce x 0 such that fx 0 = with probability at least s 1 k, and InvProb F I 1 ; k = s 1 k . For the analysis, rst note that in Experiment 1 , s 2 k = Pr 1 fv 0 = w Pr 1 fv 0 = w & f x 6 = + P r 1 f x = : The rst term on the right equals InvProb F I 2 ; k , which is negligible by the one-wayness of F. The second term on the right is also negligible, since otherwise one can invert F by the following simple algorithm I 3 : given f;z, it picks x at random from the domain of f and returns x.
Remark 3.4 One can verify that the trapdoor functions g produced in the above construction are regular ie. the size of g ,1 y is the same for all y 2 Rangeg if the original one-way functions f are regular. Thus, adding regularity as a requirement i s not likely to su ce for making public-key cryptosystems.
4 From trapdoor functions to cryptosystems Theorem 3.1 coupled with ImRu says that it is unlikely that general trapdoor functions will yield semantically secure public-key cryptosystems. However, in our construction of Section 3.1 the resulting trapdoor function was very non-injective" in the sense that the pre-image size was exponential in the security parameter. So, we next ask, what is the power of trapdoor function families with polynomially bounded pre-image size? We show a positive result: Theorem 4.1 If there exist trapdoor one-way function families with polynomially bounded preimage size, then there exists a family of unapproximable trapdoor predicates with exponentially small decryption error. Theorem 4.1 extends the well-known result of Ya, GoMi that injective trapdoor functions yield semantically secure public-key cryptosystems, by showing that the injectivity requirement can be relaxed. Coupled with ImRu this also implies that it is unlikely that the analogue of Theorem 3.1 can be shown for trapdoor functions with polynomially bounded pre-image sizes.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Let F = fF k g k2N be a family of trapdoor one-way functions with pre-image size bounded by a polynomial Q. The construction is in two steps. We rst build an unapproximable family of trapdoor predicates P with decryption error 1=2,1= polyk, and then reduce the decryption error by repetition to get the family claimed in the theorem.
The rst step uses the Goldreich-Levin inner-product construction GoLe . This construction says that if f is a one-way function, one can securely encrypt a bit b via the triple fx; r ; where = b x r with r a random string, x 2 Domf, and denoting the inner-product mod 2. Now, if f is an injective trapdoor function, then with the trapdoor information, one can recover b from fx, r, and by nding x and computing b = x r. If instead f has polynomial-size pre-images, the correct" x will only be recovered with an inverse polynomial probability. However, we will show that the rest of the time, the success probability is exactly 50. This gives a noticeable 1 2 + 1 polyk bias towards the right value of b. Now, this slight bias needs to beampli ed, which is done by repeating the construction many times in parallel and having the decryptor take the majority of its guesses to the bit in the di erent coordinates. A full description and proof follow.
We may assume wlog that there is a polynomial lk such that Rangef f0; 1g lk for all f 2 F k and all k 2 N. We n o w describe how to use the Goldreich-Levin inner-product construction GoLe to build P = fP k g k2N . We associate to any f 2 F k a predicate p de ned as follows: Predicate pb Here denotes XOR ie. addition mod 2 and denotes the inner-product mod 2. The generator algorithm for P will choose f;tp F-Gen1 k and then output p; tp with p de ned as above. Notice that p is computable in PPT if f is.
The inversion algorithm P-Inv is given p, the trapdoor tp, and a triple y;r; . It rst runs the inversion algorithm F-Inv of F on inputs f;tp; y to obtain x 0 , and then outputs the bit b 0 = x 0 r. It is clear that the inversion algorithm is not always successful, but in the next claim we prove that it is successful appreciably more often than random guessing.
Claim 4.2 P is an unapproximable trapdoor predicate family, with decryption error at most 1=2 , 1= 2Qk . Proof: We know that F is one-way. Thus, the inner product is a hardcore bit for F GoLe . This implies that P is unapproximable. It is left to show that the decryption error of P is as claimed, namely that DecErr P P -Inv; k as de ned in Equation 1 is at most 1=2 , 1= 2Qk . property | namely, that F-Inv produces an element o f f , 1 y with probability at least 1=pk for some polynomial p. Essentially the same proof will show that P-Inv can guess b correctly with probability at least 1=2 + 1 = 2Qkpk .
From cryptosystems to trapdoor functions
In this section we investigate the relation between semantically secure public key cryptosystems and injective trapdoor functions. It is known that the existence of unapproximable trapdoor predicates is equivalent to the existence of semantically secure public-key encryption GoMi . It is also known that injective trapdoor one-way functions can be used to construct unapproximable trapdoor predicates Ya see also GoLe . In this section, we ask whether the converse is true:
Question 5.1 Can unapproximable trapdoor predicates beused to construct injective trapdoor one-way functions? Note the importance of the injectiveness condition in Question 5.1. We already know that noninjective trapdoor functions can beconstructed from trapdoor predicates whether the latter are injective or not because trapdoor predicates imply one-way functions ImLu which in turn imply trapdoor functions by Theorem 3.1.
We suggest a construction which requires an additional random looking" function G and prove that the scheme is secure when G is implemented as a random oracle to which the adversary also has access. Hence, IF it is possible to implement using one-way functions a function G with su ciently strong randomness properties" to maintain the security of this scheme, then Question 5.1 would have a positive answer as one-way functions can beconstructed from unapproximable trapdoor predicates ImLu .
The key di erence between trapdoor functions and trapdoor predicates is that predicates are probabilistic, in that their evaluation is a probabilistic process. Hence, our construction is essentially a de-randomization process.
Suppose we h a v e a family P of unapproximable trapdoor predicates, and we w ant to construct a family F of injective one-way trapdoor functions from P. A rst approach would be to take an instance p of P and construct an instance f of F as fb 1 b 2 b k k r 1 k k r k = p b 1 ; r 1 k k p b k ; r k ; where k is the security parameter. Standard direct product arguments Ya imply that F constructed in this manner is one-way. However, F may fail to be trapdoor; the trapdoor information associated with p only allows one to recover b 1 ; : : : ; b k , but not r 1 ; : : : ; r k .
Our approach to xing this construction is to instead have r 1 ; : : : ; r k determined by applying some random-looking" function G Since G must be length-increasing, an obvious choice for G is a pseudo-random generator. A somewhat circular intuitive argument can be made for the security of this construction: If one does not know b 1 ; : : : ; b k , then r 1 ; : : : ; r k look random," and if r 1 ; : : : ; r k look random," then it should behard to recover b 1 ; : : : ; b k b y the unapproximability of P. In Appendix A, we show that this argument is in fact false, in that there is a choice of an unapproximable trapdoor predicate P and a pseudorandom generator G for which the resulting scheme is insecure. However, it is still possible that there are choices of functions G that make the above secure. Below we show that the scheme is secure when G is implemented as a truly random function, ie. a random oracle to which the adversary also has access. Intuitively, having access to the oracle with non-negligible probability then it can invert f with non-negligible probability without making the oracle call, by outputting the query. We now proceed with a more formal description of the random oracle model and our result. The random oracle model. In any cryptographic scheme which operates in the random oracle model, all parties are given in addition to their usual resources the ability to make oracle queries BeRo . It is postulated that all oracle queries, independent of the party which makes them, are answered by a single function, denoted O, which is uniformly selected among all possible functions where the set of possible functions is determined by the security parameter.
The See Sections 1.2 and 1.3 for a discussion of the interpretation of such a result. We n o w proceed to the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.2
Let P = fP k g k2N beafamily of unapproximable trapdoor predicates. Let qk beapolynomial upper bound on the number of random bits used by a n y p 2 P k . When used with security parameter k, w e view the oracle as a function O : f0; 1g ! f 0 ; 1 g k q k
.
We de ne a family F = fF k g k2N of trapdoor functions in the random oracle model as follows: We associate to any p 2 P k the function f that E occurs with negligible probability, it su ces to argue that both F and E^F occur with negligible probability.
First we show that F occurs with negligible probability. Notice that whether or not A O queries O at b 1 b k in Experiment 5.10 will not change if Step 6 is removed. This is because its behavior cannot be a ected by the change in Ob 1 b k u n til it has already queried that position of the oracle. If
Step 6 is removed from Experiment 5.10, we obtain Experiment 5.7. Hence, the probability o f F is negligible by Claim 5.9.
Similarly, the probability that z = b 1 b k and A O never queries the oracle at b 1 b k will not change if Step 6 is removed. Thus, the probability o f E F is bounded above by the probability that z = b 1 b k in Experiment 5.7, which is negligible by Claim 5.8.
Remark 5.11 If the family of unapproximable trapdoor predicates we start with has negligible decryption error, then the family of trapdoor functions we construct will in general also have negligible decryption error and may fail to be injective with some small probability.
By rst reducing the decryption error of the predicate family to exp, k 3 as in the proof of Theorem 4.1 and then using the oracle to derandomize the inversion algorithm, one can produce an injective family that has zero decryption error with probability 1 , 2 , k where the probability is just taken over the choice of the oracle.
Below w e show that if there exist pseudorandom number generators and unapproximable trapdoor predicate families, then there exists a pseudorandom number generator G 0 and an unapproximable trapdoor predicate family P 0 for which applying the construction of Section 5 with G 0 replacing the random oracle results in a function family which is not one-way.
In the construction below, let P = fP k g k2N beany unapproximable trapdoor predicate family and let q 0 k be a polynomial upper bound on the number of random bits used by p 2 P k . Below we often use the shorthand q = q 0 k + 1 . Also, let G beany pseudorandom generator with length function lk = 2 kq. Westart by modifying P and G to get a new trapdoor family P 0 and a new pseudorandom generator G 0 .
The modified generator. The new generator takes as input a 2k bit seed s 0 = b 1 b 2 k , and will output a string of length 2kq, as follows: The modified predicate family. Next we de ne a modi ed predicate family P 0 = fP 0 k g k2N . We associate to any p 2 P k a predicate p 0 2 P 0 k which takes input b 2 f 0 ; 1 g and coins s 1 ks, where s 1 is a bit and jsj = q 0 k, and is de ned by p 0 b; s 1 ks = s 1 bkpb; s :
The distribution on P 0 k is that given by selecting p P k and setting p 0 to the above. Claim A.3 If P is an unapproximable trapdoor predicate family, then so is P 0 . Proof: The intuition is that s 1 b is independent of both b and pb; s. A formal proof can be given that the ability to predict P 0 implies the ability to predict P. Details omitted.
The construction fails. Now apply the construction of Section 5 to P 0 using G 0 as the random- 
